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Russia is often considered to be an anomaly amongst the European empires, and its 
ambivalent status is further clouded by the seventy years of aggressively modernising 
Soviet rule that preceded its collapse. Across all its former territories, elements of the 
Soviet and even the Tsarist legacy are still live political issues: tangled borders, new 
nationalities, patterns of migration, strategic imperatives, and open warfare all 
function within the ghostly framework of the Russian Empire. This is so even though 
the destinies of its constituent parts over the last twenty years have been so divergent, 
ranging from EU membership for the Baltic States to a return to the personality cult in 
post-communist Turkmenistan. In part this is simply a function of the empire’s 
vastness, and accordingly any assessment, however brief and superficial (as this 
chapter inevitably will be), must take into a account the long process of Russian 
expansion, the different circumstances under which territories were incorporated into 
the empire, and their varied experiences of imperial or Soviet rule. As political 
circumstances within and outside the former USSR have changed, so, inevitably, have 
interpretations of Russian imperial history. Immediacy is what makes the Russian 
case truly distinctive: Russia’s relations with the former republics are far from 
postcolonial, and the Russian federation remains an imperial polity rather than a 
nation-state. Accordingly, we are not dealing with ‘echoes’ of imperialism here at all, 
but with a cacophony of urgent and immediate legacies. 
 
The expansion of Russia 
 
The course of Russian imperial expansion spanned almost five hundred years, and the 
process of conquest and incorporation exercises a decisive influence over the imperial 
legacy today. It is useful, if a little over-simplified, to think of the Russian empire in 
terms of a series of concentric circles of territory, each of which represents a different 
phase of expansion, and a process of more or less successful assimilation to the old 
Muscovite ‘core’. Russia herself had been under the suzerainty of the Turco-Mongol 
Golden Horde until the mid-fifteenth century, and the administrative and 
psychological legacy of the ‘Tatar yoke’ to the Russian state remains a matter of 
considerable debate amongst historians.
1
 The beginnings of Russian Imperialism are 
usually dated from the fall of Kazan to Ivan the Terrible in 1552, which saw large 
numbers of Muslim Tatars, together with pagan Turkic and Finno-Ugric groups of the 
Volga Region, incorporated into what had been a largely Orthodox, Slavic polity.
2
 
This was followed by the conquest of two other successor khanates of the Golden 
Horde, Astrakhan (in the Volga Delta) and Siberia. In the seventeenth century Russia 
would face a threat from the West, in the form of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, whilst the Crimean Khanate (under Ottoman suzerainty) on the 
state’s southern flank remained a powerful and largely hostile force. Meanwhile 
Cossack mercenaries and fur-trappers swiftly spread through Siberia, reaching the 
Pacific coast at Okhotsk by 1641. The indigenous peoples of Siberia soon found 
themselves swamped even by the limited number of Russian settlers who flowed into 
the region in this period, and were often decimated by the diseases and alcoholism 
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which they brought in their wake. Russian expansion in the Far East received a check 
with the treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) which conceded China’s control of the Amur 
valley; nevertheless the empire had acquired a vast tract of territory which gradually 
attracted peasant settlers, many from the persecuted Old Believer minority.
3
 
Stretching from Moscow to the Pacific, all these regions remain part of the Russian 
federation today, with Russians in an overall majority in all but a few parts of 
Northern Siberia. However this apparent political and ethnic unity disguises enormous 
cultural diversity, some of which is formally recognised through the existence of 
‘autonomous regions’ such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Yakutia, whilst some 
other minorities such as the Muslim Nogais of the Astrakhan region do not appear on 
maps of Russia at all.
 
 
The emergence of the militarised, bureaucratic Petrine state from the late 
1600s saw Russia consolidate and expand her position in the West, whilst also 
penetrating ever more deeply into Asia. Beginning with victory over the Swedes at the 
battle of Poltava in 1709, over the course of the eighteenth century Russia acquired a 
vast swathe of European territory stretching from Karelia almost to the Danube, 
taking in the lands of ancient Rus’ in Ukraine, the Baltic and most of Poland along the 
way. These regions were to present the empire with some of its most intractable 
problems in the nineteenth century. This was partly because their populations tended 
to be more prosperous and better-educated than those in Russia proper, whilst their 
political traditions were at odds with the principle of autocracy: it was in this region 
that the Tsarist state first had to confront the challenge of romantic nationalism.
4
 With 
the annexation of what came to be known as the ‘Western borderlands’ (Zapadnye 
Okrainy) Russia also acquired its vast, and in official eyes contaminating, Jewish 
population, and struggled to keep it confined to this ‘Pale of Settlement’.5 On the 
other hand, the empire found some of its most loyal servants in the Baltic German 
aristocracy, who played a crucial role within the empire’s ruling elite until the 
Revolution.
6
 The Crimean khanate finally fell in the 1770s, opening up the European 
steppe north of the Black Sea to peasant colonisation as the Ottoman Empire was 
rolled back, making this one of Russia’s earliest ‘oriental’ conquests.7 This region was 
renamed ‘New Russia’ or ‘Tauride’, the first name reflecting its status as a new 
colony of settlement, the second its classical heritage as the home of Pontic Greek 
colonies, and both part of a process which saw a conscious elimination of earlier 
names which were reminders of the region’s Turkic and nomadic past.8   
 
Russian expansion in the Caucasus followed a slower and bloodier path. The 
black-earth and steppe areas between the lower Volga and the Caucasus mountains 
had begun to attract Russian peasant settlers from the early sixteenth century onwards, 
but until the late eighteenth century Tsarist power in the region was represented 
largely by semi-independent communities of Cossacks along the Terek river, whose 
relationship with the Chechen, Daghestani and Circassian mountaineers of the frontier 
was far from wholly hostile.
9
 Peter the Great’s capture of the Daghestani city of 
Derbent in 1722 proved short-lived, but in the early 1800s Georgia and Armenia were 
annexed, whilst Persia lost the northern part of the province of Azerbaijan at the treaty 
of Gulistan in 1813. The Caucasus Mountains lay athwart Russia’s communications 
with these newly-acquired territories to their South, but the subjugation of the 
mountaineers would occupy thousands of Russian troops for over fifty years. General 
Yermolov, in a series of brutal campaigns from 1817-1827, espoused a scorched earth 
policy which drove an ever-deeper wedge between the Russians and the inhabitants of 
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the Northern Caucasus, ‘contracting’ the middle ground of cultural and economic 
exchange which had existed before.
10
 His cruelty provoked a general uprising in 
Chechnya in 1825, which produced the greatest hero of the anti-Russian struggle, 
Imam Shamil, who was not captured until 1859. The war finally came to an end in 
1864, when 300,000 Circassians chose exile in the Ottoman Empire rather than 
Russian rule. The legacy of the long conflict amongst the Russians was mixed: on the 
one hand it created a deep and long-lasting distrust of Islam, and brought about a loss 
of faith in the tactic of absorbing local aristocracies which had served Russia so well 
in the past, whilst the Muslims of the Caucasus were characterised as ‘Savages’ and 
‘Brigands’, an attitude that persists to this day.11 On the other hand the Caucasus 
became a vital component of the Russian romantic imagination, inspiring Pushkin, 
Lermontov and Tolstoy, for whom the mountaineers symbolised a freedom which did 
not exist in Russian society.
12
 Overall, the European and Caucasian territories Russia 
acquired in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries constitute a more liminal 
zone, where states that are now independent blur into regions that remain part of the 
Russian ‘metropole’. Whilst those who identify as ethnic Russians are usually a 
minority in these regions, many Russians would still consider the Caucasus, Ukraine 
and in particular Crimea to be ‘ours’ (nash).13 
 
Finally we come to the most ‘colonial’ of Russia’s territories in Central Asia, 
which were generally excluded from the civic structures of Imperial Russia and seen 
as particularly ‘backward’ in the Soviet period. With the possible exception of parts of 
Northern Kazakhstan, few Russians today would consider this region to be truly 
‘Russian’. The Kazakhs of the Inner Horde came under Russian sovereignty with the 
submission of Abu’l-Khayr Khan to the Empress Anna in 1732,14 and after 1734 the 
newly-created fortress-town of Orenburg became the centre of Russian influence on 
the Asian steppe. Despite resistance from part of the Kazakh Middle Horde led by 
Kenesary Kasimov,
15
 by the late 1850s a series of campaigns on the Steppe, and the 
construction of a line of fortresses through Kazakh lands had brought most of this 
region under Russian control. After a brief check during the Crimean War, the process 
of conquest continued apace, with the fall of Tashkent in 1865 marking the beginning 
of Russian incursions into the settled oasis region of Central Asia. Subsequently the 
Emirate of Bukhara submitted to Russian suzerainty and became a protectorate, whilst 
Khiva also fell in 1873. 1878 saw the beginning of the exceptionally bloody conquest 
of Transcaspia, marked by the massacre of thousands of Turkmen by General Mikhail 
Skobelev at the fortress of Geok-Tepe in 1881.
16
 The empire’s southern boundary 
assumed the form it would retain until 1991 with the annexation of the Kushka oasis 
in 1885, and of the Pamir region in the 1890s. From the mid 1890s the state 
encouraged peasant migration from the land-hungry regions of European Russia 
across the Urals to Siberia and south to the Asiatic steppes, and the numbers of 
Russian and Ukrainian settlers increased exponentially with the construction of the 
Transsiberian and Orenburg-Tashkent railways.
17
 By the last years of Tsarist rule 
there were ambitious plans to swamp the indigenous population of the Steppe and 
Turkestan with millions more settlers, accompanied by a vast extension of irrigated 
agriculture.
18
 While the demographic balance in the northern steppe was profoundly 
altered, there was no question that these territories remained alien – chuzhoi, and 
populated by inorodtsy – those of a ‘different birth’.19  
Simultaneously the Russian presence in the Far East was consolidated with the 
annexation of the Amur region and the founding of Vladivostok in the 1850s and 60s, 
continuing into the early twentieth century with the acquisition of a warm-water naval 
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base on the Pacific, Port Arthur, in 1897, the construction of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway to link Vladivostok and Port Arthur with European Russia via the 
Transsiberian railway, and the de facto annexation of Manchuria.
20
 Humiliating defeat 
in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 curbed Russian ambitions in the region, and in 
the long term would prove of enormous significance to the other European powers, 
whose colonial subjects elsewhere in Asia were widely encouraged by this defeat of 
Europeans by Asians.
21
 In this region, then, Russia had been forced to draw in her 
horns somewhat even before 1917, and today the Primorskii Krai or ‘maritime 
region’ around Vladivostok remains, for demographic reasons, one of her more fragile 
possessions. 
 
 
Understanding Russian Imperialism 
 
The question of how to describe and categorise this enormous polity, spanning two 
continents, at least fifty languages and three major religions, has exercised historians 
at least since Nikolai Karamzin wrote his Memoir on Ancient & Modern Russia in the 
1820s.
22
 Russia was a great, land-based empire, with its roots in the early-modern 
period, whose titular nationality was ill-defined and enjoyed no particular privileges, 
whose ruling elite was cosmopolitan, with a disproportionate role played by non-
Russians, in particular Poles, Baltic Germans and Georgians. It was difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify a particular territory at the heart of the empire with the Russian 
‘nation’, and at least until the late nineteenth century the core of Russian imperial 
ideologies was the ruling Romanov dynasty.
23
 With leading noble families such as the 
Stroganovs and Yusupovs descended from Muslim Tatars, with colonists in Siberia 
‘going native’ rather than the natives becoming Russified, racial boundaries seem 
blurred.
24
 Class or soslovie (estate), not race, was what determined hierarchies in 
Russia. Above all, where was that vital distinction between metropole and colony, 
that barrier between the political, cultural and territorial ‘nation’ at the heart of 
Empire, and the colonies at the periphery, so characteristic of ‘western’ colonialism? 
Russia’s identity is said to be inseparable from Empire, her nationalism warped and 
weakened by it, her people even described as the chief victims of ‘their’ empire by 
some historians.
25
 Even today one cannot really isolate ‘Russia’ on a map: the rump 
of the Russian Federation which was left behind after the break-up of the USSR, with 
its Far Eastern and Siberian territories and its patchwork of ‘autonomous’ provinces 
for different nationalities, is very far from being a nation-state. All of this would 
suggest that if Russia belongs in any ‘category’, it is that of the early-modern dynastic 
empires which survived into the modern period, those of the Habsburgs and the 
Ottomans. Some influential cultural historians have argued that to equate Russian 
Imperialism with that of the British or French is problematic and inaccurate, but there 
are also some striking parallels.
26 
 
In the nineteenth century, views of the nature of Russian Imperialism varied 
widely both within and outside the empire. While G. N. Curzon could remark that the 
Russian conquest of Central Asia was ‘a conquest of Orientals by Orientals’, other 
observers such as Eugene Schuyler or Francis Skrine viewed Russian Imperialism as 
simply another (perhaps more backward) manifestation of the wider phenomenon of 
European expansion.
27
 Within Russia there was an ‘Asianist’ sub-strand of Slavophile 
thought among some intellectuals and publicists in Moscow and St Petersburg which 
presented the Russians as occupying a unique position between Europe and Asia, 
giving them a greater affinity with Asiatic peoples and thus (or so it was argued) a 
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greater right to rule over them. Slavophile Philosophers such as Nikolai Danilevsky 
and Konstantin Leontiev argued that Russia had an Imperial Sonderweg, qualitatively 
different from that of the other European powers and characterised by greater 
tolerance and assimilation to Russian culture among conquered peoples,
28
 whilst 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky famously saw Asiatic conquests as a means of escaping Russia’s 
‘backwardness’: ‘In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, whereas to Asia we shall 
go as masters.
’29 
 
However, the officials and army officers who actually administered Russia’s 
(largely Muslim) borderlands in the Caucasus and Central Asia generally saw 
themselves as Europeans on a civilising mission, frequently finding parallels with the 
British experience in India or that of the French in Algeria, whilst peasant settlement 
in the Steppe and Siberia drew forth comparisons with the opening-up of the 
American West.
30
 Accordingly, by and large, although the diversity and peculiarities 
of Russian Imperialism were widely acknowledged by Russians and outsiders alike 
before 1917, it was not considered entirely sui generis, and most Russian 
commentators were perfectly happy to see Russian expansion across Asia as part of 
the wider European colonizing and civilizing mission.
31
  
 
It is probable that biological racism was less widespread and influential in the 
Russian empire than in the West, but it was by no means unknown, and in any case 
this was only one of many markers of the difference and inferiority of subject peoples, 
racial, religious and cultural, which the Russians and other Europeans employed.
32
 In 
the western borderlands, beginning in the early 1860s with draconian restrictions on 
publications in the ‘Little Russian’ (Ukrainian) language, the Tsarist state pursued a 
policy of what is usually known as ‘Russification’ in an attempt to create a larger 
‘national’ core for the empire, although this policy of repression was never matched 
by any positive measures to encourage assimilation through schooling, of the kind 
that took place in France in the same period.
33
  Russia may not have had as clear a 
distinction between metropole and colony as a ‘classic’ European maritime empire, 
but there was an idea of what constituted the ‘core’ or ‘European’ areas of the empire, 
and this was reflected administratively in the distinction between areas under civilian 
and under military rule, those in which the liberal reforms of the 1860s were applied, 
and those where they were withheld.
34
 There was no single concept of Russian 
Imperial ‘citizenship’, any more than there was in the British empire, and all the 
evidence of the last years of Tsarism suggests that in Russia’s fledgling democratic 
culture the enjoyment of political rights and ‘Europeanness’ (if not Russianness) were 
becoming increasingly closely aligned.
35
 
 
 
Nation-building in the Soviet Period 
 
The Russian Revolution of 1917 saw an avowedly anti-Imperial regime inherit (and in 
many cases reconquer) almost all the non-Russian territories that had been part of the 
late-Tsarist empire. To many it seemed as if the old empire had simply continued in 
another guise, and indeed that is how the Soviet Union was presented by many 
western commentators until its collapse in 1991, with Soviet ‘Nationalities policy’ 
seen as nothing more than window-dressing, a cunning disguise for the continuation 
of colonialism.
36
 However, the reality was more complex than this, both in practice 
and in representation. With the demise of the Baltic German aristocracy which had 
made up such an important part of the old Empire’s ruling elite, ethnic Russians 
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certainly occupied if anything a more dominant place in the structures of Soviet 
power than they had in the Tsarist state: but this was true mainly at the centre. In the 
peripheries, where new ‘national’ republics were formed, non-Russians in the form of 
locally recruited party cadres wielded far more power than had usually been the case 
under the Tsarist regime. The early Soviet policy of korenizatsiya, ‘striking roots’ or 
nation-building, together with policies promoting mass literacy, industrialisation and 
anti-religious campaigns were qualitatively different from anything undertaken in the 
Tsarist period, and are better compared with what was taking place simultaneously in 
Reza Shah’s Iran and Atatürk’s Turkey.37 In its Asian borderlands the Tsarist state 
had been content simply to maintain military security and collect taxes, whilst in 
Poland and Ukraine it had pursued aggressive policies of Russification. In its early 
years the Soviet state instead strove to overcome the legacy of ‘Great Russian 
Chauvinism’ and shepherd its more ‘backward’ peoples through the national stage 
which both Lenin and Stalin thought crucial to the development of Socialism.
38
 This 
was reflected in the historiography of the time, which presented Tsarist Imperialism 
as cruel, exploitative and negative, and sought to dissociate Soviet rule from it 
entirely.
39
 To begin with, this was undoubtedly more than just rhetorical window-
dressing: even in the traditionally rebellious North Caucasus many Chechens and 
Daghestanis were active participants in the early Soviet project.
40
 Modern Ukrainian 
nationalism is arguably in large part a legacy of the korenizatsiya policies of the 
1920s and 1930s, which for the first time saw 97% of Ukrainian schoolchildren 
making acquaintance with the literary form of their national language.
41
 After the 
Second World War, the Ukrainian-speaking regions of Poland were incorporated in 
the Union republic, whose borders also included large numbers of Russian-speakers in 
the Don region, the formerly nomadic steppes north of the Black Sea with their 
diverse settler population and cosmopolitan cities (most notably Odessa) and 
eventually, in 1954, the Crimean Peninsula, purged of its Tatar population during the 
Second World War and now almost entirely Russian-speaking. However, the vagaries 
of Soviet boundary-drawing ensured that, whilst Ukraine now had a larger ‘national’ 
territory than any Ukrainian nationalist of the nineteenth century would have dreamed 
of, much of its population had never fully identified as Ukrainian in the first place, a 
legacy which continues to cause severe problems today. 
 
Elsewhere in the USSR, the late 1930s and the outbreak of the Second World 
War also saw some significant changes: many elements of korenizatsiya were phased 
out, at least in the Western regions, although in most cases its nationalist legacy was 
far too potent to be entirely suppressed. The Russians were officially anointed as the 
‘elder brothers’ of the Soviet family of nations, whilst among historians Tsarist 
Imperialism was rehabilitated as having had a ‘progressive significance’.42 The post-
war years saw increasingly large numbers of Russians being despatched to other 
Republics, though normally as urban workers or technical experts rather than as 
agricultural settlers, with the notable exception of Kazakhstan. In the post-Stalin era 
the autonomy enjoyed by local party structures was not entirely fictional (the ‘great 
cotton scandal’ in Uzbekistan in the 1970s was a clear enough instance of local 
independence, albeit in the form of corruption),
43
 and officially-sanctioned versions of 
‘national culture’ continued to be promoted. The history of inter-ethnic relations in 
the USSR in large part remains to be written. Whilst there were occasional outbreaks 
of tension, such as the Pakhtakor football riots in Tashkent in 1969, and the 
Zheltoqsan protests against the appointment of a Russian general-secretary of the 
Kazakh communist party in Alma-ata in 1986, in general there seem to have been 
A. Morrison ‘The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union: too soon to talk of Echoes?’ in Echoes of Empire: 
Memory, Identity and the Legacy of Imperialism. Edited by: Kalypso Nicolaidis, Berny Sèbe & Gabrielle Maas 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2015) pp.155 - 174 
 7 
fewer racial tensions than before 1917. Intermarriage between Russians and Muslim 
peoples (with the exception of the Tatars and Kazakhs) remained relatively rare,
44
 but 
close social relations were not uncommon: to give just one example, the otherwise ill-
fated ‘Virgin Lands’ scheme in Northern Kazakhstan gave birth to a strikingly mixed 
society where Kazakhs, Russian peasant settlers, Caucasian deportees and enthusiastic 
young Soviet volunteers rubbed shoulders relatively harmoniously.
45
 That this co-
existed with widespread racial prejudice among European Slavs towards Jews and 
Caucasian Muslims in particular is one of the many puzzles of Soviet history, 
although it seems that racist attitudes towards the minority peoples of the USSR were 
(and remain) more common among those who lived in European Russia than amongst 
the Slavs who lived in the cosmopolitan cities of Baku, Tashkent or Almaty, where 
they mixed with ‘Asiatics’ on a daily basis.46 
 
The fall of Communism and after 
 
The collapse of the USSR in 1991 saw a scramble by historians and political scientists 
to explain the demise of the beast they had studied so long, which in many cases led 
them to come to new conclusions about the nature of Soviet rule. Some espoused the 
‘deep-freeze’ theory – namely that the ‘prison of peoples’ which was late-Tsarist 
Russia had remained in suspended animation throughout the seventy years of Soviet 
rule, before latent nationalist passions were finally unleashed by the crumbling of 
central authority.
47
 The conflicts which immediately emerged in Tajikistan and the 
Caucasus were certainly a result of the slackening of central control, although in most 
cases their roots lay in Soviet-era disputes over borders and access to state patronage 
rather than in events before 1917. In the absence of mediation from Moscow, war 
broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabagh enclave, 
whilst Georgia sought to establish full and direct control over the autonomous 
provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which fell within its borders, with disastrous 
results. However, it soon became clear that whilst for the Warsaw pact countries and 
the Baltic states independence and freedom from Moscow’s control could not come 
soon enough,
48
 the other constituent republics of the USSR were much more 
ambivalent about leaving it, and thus losing the patronage and arbitration of Moscow. 
The Central Asian Republics voted in referenda to maintain the USSR, whilst their 
leaders almost without exception supported the hardline coup of 1991. Furthermore, 
many of the ‘nationalities’ in these regions had not even existed before 1917, and 
could hardly have ‘re-emerged’ in 1991: the ‘Uzbeks’ were clearly at least in part a 
creation of the Soviet era.
49
 If anything it was Russian nationalism which destroyed 
the USSR, as many Russians (not entirely wrongly) saw their Republic as subsidising 
all the others. The Soviet Union collapsed when Boris Yeltsin succeeded in investing 
the hollow structures of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic with real power.
50
  
 
Since then, Russian nationalism has been exploited heavily by the Putin and 
Medvedev regimes, whilst racism towards migrants from the former Soviet republics 
of the Caucasus and Central Asia and paranoia regarding Russia’s neighbours are 
increasingly common.
51
 This is reflected in much contemporary Russian 
historiography, where Russia’s Imperial past is regarded with a mixture of nostalgia, 
self-righteousness and outright jingoism. A figure such as General Mikhail 
Dmitrievich Skobelev, who ordered the massacre of thousands Turkmen after the 
siege of Gök-Tepe in 1881 and was excoriated in Soviet historiography, can now be 
rehabilitated as a ‘Hero of Empire’.52 Thinly disguised as “Sobolev”, the General has 
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also figured prominently in two of the best-selling Boris Akunin novels, one of which 
has been turned into a film whose portrayal of the Ottomans is ripe with old-fashioned 
‘Orientalism’.53 A new statue of Skobelev has apparently been planned for Il’in 
square in Moscow, to replace the original equestrian statue erected on nearby 
Tverskaya Street in 1912 and destroyed by the Bolsheviks, although it is not clear if it 
will ever be built.
54
 New statues of General Yermolov, the ‘hammer of the Caucasus’ 
have appeared in the North Caucasian towns of Stavropol, Mineral’nye Vody and 
Pyatigorsk, whilst Orenburg also has a new monument to General V. A. Perovsky, 
who played a leading role in the conquest of Central Asia.
55
 
 
Since 1991, the former constituent republics of the USSR have become nation-
states, but in most cases their ‘new’ identities rest firmly on Soviet foundations. This 
is particularly true in Central Asia, whose republics were carved out of the territories 
of Bukhara, Khiva and Russian Turkestan in the 1920s, in a complex process of 
negotiation between the Communist leadership in Moscow and local party cadres. 
This was not, as many Western commentators believed, the product of a deliberate 
Soviet policy of ‘divide and rule’ and creation of minorities. Instead it was partly the 
inevitable product of an attempt to apply ideas of the nation derived from nineteenth-
century Europe to a region where this category made little sense, partly a consequence 
of relying on the categories used by late-Tsarist ethnographers and census-takers, and 
partly the result of local horse-trading.
56
 Whilst the new republics had a territorial 
form (which continued to shift until the 1980s as boundaries were repeatedly tinkered 
with) their borders were fairly notional: it was the Soviet State which restricted (and 
ordered) the movement of labour and the patterns of growth and settlement, not the 
existence of borders. Since independence the hardening of the borders between the 
five republics has caused numerous problems, particularly in areas where they are 
closely intermeshed and pay scant attention to geographical features, most notably the 
Ferghana Valley.
57
 For instance, the region around the city of Khujand (Leninabad in 
the Soviet era), the northern ‘bump’ of Tajikistan, is cut off from the rest of the 
country by a range of mountains, and in the Soviet era was closely integrated both 
economically and socially with the surrounding regions of Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. After independence Khujand found itself hemmed in on all sides by 
newly-impermeable borders, with the only outlet a dangerous mountain road to the 
south. Whilst communications with Dushanbe have now improved, continued bad 
relations with Uzbekistan ensure that the region remains cut off from its economic 
hinterland, whilst modern Tajik nationalist ideology, which emphasises both the 
Persian language and ‘Aryan’ ethnicity, is particularly alien to this mixed, bilingual 
semi-enclave.
58
 Meanwhile, at the eastern end of the Ferghana valley, many Uzbek 
families are now divided by the frontier between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
something revealed clearly when many of those who fled the 2010 pogroms in Osh 
found shelter with relatives on the Uzbek side of the frontier.
59
 In each case, these 
borders were of little or no importance in the Soviet era, and it was only accidentally 
that they came to define the limits of sovereignty after 1991. Over the coming years 
they promise to be one of empire’s more intractable ‘echoes’, as there are few signs 
that they will become more open or relaxed. 
 
With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, and despite the civil war in Tajikistan, the 
forms of government of the Central Asian republics show considerable (though not 
complete) continuity with the Soviet period. The personnel are in some cases the 
same: Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan and, until 
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his death, Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan were all the first secretaries of their 
republics’ respective communist parties before 1991. However, all of these countries, 
except Turkmenistan, are much more open to outside influences than they were in the 
Soviet period, and the work of nation and state-building continues much more 
actively than before, often with brutally repressive results.
60
 This mixture of change 
and continuity is reflected in historiography. Despite ritualistic denunciations of 
Russian colonialism in some new historical work, and Karimov’s oft-quoted opinion 
that ‘I do not consider the history written in the Soviet era to be history’,61 the 
national narratives of the new Republics are based largely on those created in the 
official histories of the Soviet period, complete with spurious theories of 
ethnogenesis, government-sanctioned ‘national heroes’, and certain canonical texts in 
which the culture of the nation is said to reside. The additions normally consist of 
more monarchical and militaristic characters who were frowned on in the Soviet 
period (such as Amir Timur in Uzbekistan), and a rehabilitation of the Muslim 
reformist movements which appeared in the region in the late nineteenth century 
(denounced as ‘bourgeois’ in the Soviet period). Nowhere is this truer than in 
Uzbekistan, where such few historical publications as do emerge follow Karimov’s 
injunction, invariably invoked in the introduction to modern Uzbek historical 
publications, that ‘Historical memory, the restoration of an objective and truthful 
history of the nation and its territory is given an extremely important place in the 
revival and growth of national self-consciousness and national pride.’62 In Uzbekistan 
history is relentlessly instrumentalised for the purpose of constructing a stronger 
‘Uzbek’ identity: school textbooks portray the Khwarazmshahs, Tamerlane, Babur, 
Emir Sayyid Muzaffar of Bukhara, the Jadid reformers and the post-1917 Basmachi 
as an unbroken line of heroic ‘Uzbek’ nationalists, engaged in a struggle for ‘self-
determination’.63 Access to the national archives has become steadily more restricted 
to those whose output the regime feels it can control, whilst archival documents are 
selectively employed to create a narrative of national martyrdom in the Tsarist and 
Soviet periods.
64
 Even academic writing normally echoes older Soviet scholarship on 
the ethnogenesis of the Uzbek nation, glosses over the complexity of Central Asian 
society before the national demarcations of 1924, and the degree to which modern 
Central Asian national identities (particularly ‘Uzbek’), far from having been 
‘suppressed’ in the Soviet period, are at least in part a product of early Soviet nation-
building policies.
65
 The dangers of taking a constructivist approach to the complex 
history of Uzbek identity were revealed clearly in the furore surrounding the 
publication of Alisher Ilkhamov’s Ethnic Atlas of Uzbekistan in 2002, which was 
heavily criticised by historians close to the Uzbek Government and subsequently 
banned.
66
  
 
Russian scholars working in Central Asia have responded with anger and 
bewilderment to suggestions in recent historiography from the region that the Tsarist 
or Soviet regimes could be considered ‘colonial’.67 In the Soviet period, ‘colonialism’ 
and ‘imperialism’ were things only bourgeois powers were capable of: ergo the Soviet 
Union – and from the 1940s, by a curious process of extension, its Tsarist predecessor 
– could not be a ‘colonial’ power. This strand of thinking became entangled with 
older Slavophile ideas about the ‘natural’ and ‘organic’ nature of Russian expansion 
until for many historians there emerged a firm belief that the Russian people 
themselves are not capable of being ‘colonial’ or racist: a belief which co-exists with 
irrefutable evidence of racism and hate crimes against Caucasians and Central Asians 
in Russian cities.
68
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In the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia there is now a celebration of the brief 
periods of ‘national independence’ enjoyed by these regions between 1917 and 
ca.1920-21; the Baltic republics meanwhile romanticise the authoritarian regimes 
which ruled them throughout most of the inter-war period, and have fierce ongoing 
disputes with Russia over the interpretation and memorialisation of the Second World 
War, in which Soviet victory over the Nazis saw the re-annexation of Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia to the USSR after 1945.
69
 Resurgent Russian nationalism is 
perceived as a serious threat in this region, whilst Georgia has already discovered to 
its cost that despite post-Soviet military decline Russia remains a regional if not a 
global superpower, and that her leaders claim a special sphere of influence in the 
territories of the ‘near abroad’ – the former USSR.70 
 
Imperial Legacies 
 
The Baltic states aside, there are still numerous ties which bind the republics of the 
former USSR together, and these are more profound, and geographically closer, than 
those which link the countries of the British Commonwealth, which has its 
counterpart in the ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’ (of which, significantly, the 
Baltic Republics and Georgia are not members). After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union many Russians left the Central Asian republics (up to a third of the Russian 
population in Uzbekistan emigrated, mostly to Russia, between 1994 and 2004).
71
 
Despite this, many post-Soviet countries still have large Russian minorities (in 
Kazakhstan they make up over 20% of the population, in Estonia almost a half), and 
Russian remains a lingua franca and a path to professional success in all the Central 
Asian Republics as well as Azerbaijan and Armenia. In Ukraine almost half the 
population is Russian-speaking. Only in Georgia and the Baltic Republics has there 
been a concerted effort to shed much of this historic and cultural baggage, and that 
has caused much conflict. Russia itself still contains numerous ‘Autonomous 
Republics’ such as Tatarstan, half of whose population is Muslim, and where there are 
occasional rumblings which reveal postcolonial tensions.
72
 Most obviously there is 
Chechnya, where Russia has fought several vicious wars of repression since the mid-
1990s. The Far-Eastern territories and much of Siberia remain a sparsely-populated 
settler colony, where Chinese commercial and demographic influence is likely to play 
a crucial role in years to come. Russia herself is suffering from a rapid decline in 
population, which combined with steady immigration from the Central Asian 
republics in particular is likely to alter profoundly the nature of Russian society by the 
end of this century: some Russian commentators make alarmist predictions that by 
2050 ethnic Russians will be in a minority within the Russian Federation.
73
 This is, 
perhaps, one of the central paradoxes of the former USSR - that migration between its 
former constituent parts is far greater now than it was in Soviet times, when 
movement was strictly controlled by permits (something which is paralleled in the 
postcolonial migrations within the former French and British empires). One of the 
most profound Soviet legacies is a vast Russophone cultural and institutional sphere 
which even Central Asian labourers from remote rural backgrounds can navigate with 
relative ease, at least compared to migration to Western Europe, or even neighbouring 
regions with which they may have cultural ties such as Iran, Afghanistan and China. 
Although some Tajiks fled to Afghanistan during the civil war, the migration flows 
are overwhelmingly from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, all of which suffer 
from high unemployment, into Russia and Kazakhstan, which throughout most of the 
A. Morrison ‘The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union: too soon to talk of Echoes?’ in Echoes of Empire: 
Memory, Identity and the Legacy of Imperialism. Edited by: Kalypso Nicolaidis, Berny Sèbe & Gabrielle Maas 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2015) pp.155 - 174 
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2000s enjoyed an oil-driven construction boom that slowed only temporarily during 
the financial crisis.
74
 Even though much of the immigration is illegal, the Russian 
state largely winks at this as it needs cheap labour for its construction sites and to 
sweep its streets – whilst for the Central Asian Republics remittances from labour 
migrants represent up to 30% of GDP, although local governments do little either to 
facilitate or encourage transfers and investment, and most of the money is spent on 
traditional forms of immediate consumption, in particular elaborate feasts (tuys) and 
the building of houses.
75
 As in Germany in the 1960s, the fiction is that these are all 
Gastarbeiter who will return to their homes once their work is done, but many stay.
76
 
Xenophobia and hate crimes are a problem, especially in Moscow, and far-right 
groups and Russian skinheads often appear to target not just migrants, but all those 
obviously of non-Russian ethnicity.
77
 Whilst the Putin-Medvedev regime continues at 
least to pay lip-service to the Soviet ideal of the ‘friendship of peoples’, it is doing too 
little to aid integration and acceptance. In some respects this resembles the intolerant 
reception which migrants from South Asia and the West Indies to Britain and from 
North Africa to France encountered in the 1950s and 60s - as one journalist puts it: 
‘Moscow today is France yesterday’.78 Conversely, across Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan anything up to 50% of all families (the real proportion is uncertain) have a 
member working in Russia, and as these are overwhelmingly young men, who are 
usually married before they leave for work, this leaves hundreds of thousands of 
husbandless and fatherless families.
79
 Usually they return home for one or two months 
a year, in winter, but in some cases they start new families in Russia, and do not 
return.
80
 Thus the post-Soviet period has seen the creation of new social networks of 
knowledge, labour and kinship that span the territory of the former USSR, and which 
are denser and more intimate than the formal political ties and economic control 
which they have replaced. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The Russian empire before 1917 had many points of resemblance and divergence with 
the other European Empires. In Central Asia and the Caucasus it looked rather like 
British India or French Algeria, and these were consciously identified as backward, 
colonial territories that were never fully assimilated to the Russian ‘core’, even if the 
loss of the Caucasus remains highly contested. In Siberia it looked more like Canada 
or the American West - a successful settler colony which largely obliterated earlier 
peoples and cultures. In its western borderlands it looked more like the Habsburg or 
Ottoman Empires, and here Russia, like its multi-ethnic neighbours, was undone by a 
gradually rising tide of romantic nationalism. Despite the territorial continuity 
between the Tsarist and Soviet Empires, and the dominant role that continued to be 
played by Russians, 1917 saw a genuine shift in the nature of Russian imperialism, as 
the Soviet state sought to transform the lives and identities of its subjects in ways 
never contemplated under Tsarist rule. Conversely the break-up of the Soviet Union 
seemed sudden, swift and decisive at the time, and in the case of the Warsaw Pact 
countries and the Baltic Republics this was perhaps true – although even here the 
imperial legacy continues to do more than merely echo. Economically, Russia and 
Kazakhstan in particular have seen staggering changes, though Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan still seem to be stuck in the Brezhnev era.
81
 In the political and cultural 
sphere, however, the continuities with the USSR are more striking than the changes. 
This is not simply because even the rump of the USSR which is Russia remains in 
many ways an imperial formation, or because Russia has recently shown that she is 
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still willing and able to be aggressive beyond these borders. It is because the 
demographic and cultural legacy of the Soviet period is extremely profound: the 
USSR was much more than a ‘prison of peoples’, and many of its non-Russian 
inhabitants did not want to leave it and still regret its demise. 
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